. We study the convergence of sequences of atomic unsplittable congestion games with an increasing number of players. We consider two situations. In the first setting, each player has a weight that tends to zero, in which case the mixed equilibria of the finite games converge to the set of Wardrop equilibria of the corresponding nonatomic limit game. In the second case, players have unit weights, but participate in the game with a probability that tends to zero. In this case, the mixed equilibria converge to the set of Wardrop equilibria of another nonatomic game with suitably defined costs, which can be seen as a Poisson game in the sense of Myerson (1998b). In both settings we show that the price of anarchy of the sequence of games converges to the price of anarchy of the nonatomic limit. Beyond the case of congestion games, we establish a general result on the convergence of large games with random players towards a Poisson game. 3 4 5
I
Nonatomic congestion games were introduced by Wardrop (1952) as a model for traffic networks with many drivers, where each single player has a negligible impact on congestion. The model is stated directly in terms of continuous flows and is motivated as the limit case when the number of players grows to infinity while their weights tend to zero. Although such convergence is intuitive and expected, only some special cases have been formally addressed in the literature, mainly for atomic splittable games. Following the motivation of many of the real-world applications such as road traffic and telecommunications, it is important to consider the convergence of unsplittable routing games with finitely many players who must route a given load over a single path chosen deterministically or at random using a mixed strategy. We consider the more general class of atomic unsplittable congestion games (not necessarily routing games) and allow for heterogeneous players. The main question is whether Nash equilibria for these games converge towards a Wardrop equilibrium of a limiting nonatomic congestion game.
In a weighted congestion game, there is a finite number of players who are characterized by a type and a weight. The type determines the set of feasible strategies of a player and the weight determines the player's impact on the costs. Moreover, there is a finite set of resources and each strategy corresponds to a subset of these resources. Players of a given type have the same set of available strategies. A strategy profile for all players induces a flow on each strategy equal to the total weight of players choosing it, as well as a load on each resource equal to the total weight of players using that resource as part of their strategy. The cost of using a resource is a weakly increasing function of its load. This defines a finite cost-minimization game. As shown by Rosenthal (1973) , every congestion game in which all the players have the same weight admits a potential and, as a consequence, has equilibria in pure strategies. In general, only mixed equilibria are guaranteed to exist (cf. Nash, 1950) .
As a special case of congestion games, a routing game features a finite directed network whose edges represent the resources. The origin-destination pairs encode the types, and the corresponding origin-destination paths provide the strategies. To illustrate, consider a routing game over a simple network composed of two parallel edges with the same strictly-increasing cost function c( · ), as shown in Fig. 1 , and suppose that there are n players who need to choose an edge to route an identical weight of w ≡ d/n. Here, d denotes the total weight or demand. In a symmetric O D c(x) c(x) Figure 1 . Parallel edge network. equilibrium every player randomizes by choosing each route with probability 1/2. Consequently, the number of players on each route is distributed as a Binomial(n, 1/2) random variable. The total load on each edge is therefore d/n times a Binomial(n, 1/2), and converges in distribution to d/2, which is precisely the Wardrop equilibrium for a total demand of d units of flow. Notice that already in this simple example there is a multitude of other equilibria where n 1 and n 2 players, respectively, choose the upper and lower edges for sure (with n 1 , n 2 ≤ n/2), and the remaining players (if any) randomize appropriately so as to equalize the expected cost of both routes. As the number of players n tends to infinity, all these different equilibria converge to the unique Wardrop equilibrium with a (d/2, d/2)-split of the flow. This includes the special case of a pure equilibrium in which half of the players (up to one unit if n is odd) take each route. Angelidakis et al. (2013) and Cominetti et al. (2019) studied Bernoulli congestion games in which each player participates in the game with an independent probability. Motivated by this model, an alternative way of thinking about the limit of large games with an increasing number of players, is to consider the stochastic case in which each player has a unit weight but is present in the game with a small probability. Arguably, this might be a more natural way of modeling traffic. In fact, the contribution of an additional car to congestion is small but nonnegligible, while the congestion experienced by an agent depends on how many drivers are on the road at the same time. If we focus on a small interval around the time at which a player joins the game, the probability for the concurrent presence of other players emerges as a naturally small parameter. Taking the limit in this setting yields a different limit game in which the random loads on the edges converge to a family of Poisson random variables, and whose expected values can be again characterized as a Wardrop equilibrium of a suitably defined nonatomic game. Moreover, these limit loads can be interpreted as an equilibrium for a Poisson game in the sense of Myerson (1998b) .
To provide some insight, consider again the parallel-edge example of Fig. 1 , except that now each of the n players has a unit weight, but is present in the game with a small probability d/n. In this case the effective demand is a random variable D n ∼ Binomial(n, d/n), which converges as n → ∞ to a random variable D ∼ Poisson (d) . Also, in a symmetric equilibrium where each player choses an edge uniformly at random, the load on each route is distributed Binomial(n, d/(2n)) and converges to a Poisson(d/2), whose expected value is again d/2. We will show that this convergence holds for asymmetric equilibria and general congestion games with an increasing number of heterogenous players who are active with different vanishing probabilities.
Note that in both cases-vanishing weights and vanishing probabilities-the equilibria of the nonatomic limit games characterize the expected values of the random loads. However, in the Poisson regime the resource loads remain random in the limit, whereas in the Wardrop limit these random loads converge to a constant. Thus, the Poisson limit seems to provide a more accurate description of the traffic flows observed in real networks, which exhibit stochastic variability. This is in agreement with some theoretical models -as well as empirical evidence based on traffic counts-which exhibit a Poissonian behavior at least under moderate congestion conditions. 1.1. Our contribution. After introducing the relevant classes of congestion games in Section 2, Section 3 shows that under very weak conditions any Nash-equilibrium loads in a sequence of weighted congestion games converge to a Wardrop equilibrium of a limiting nonatomic game. More precisely, if the number of players grows to infinity and their weights tend to zero in a way that the aggregate demands converge, then, for any sequence of mixed equilibria in the finite games, the random variables that represent the resource loads converge in distribution to a Wardrop equilibrium for a nonatomic limit game. We stress that players are not assumed to be symmetric and that they may have different weights and strategy sets. As long as their weights converge to zero, the random resource loads converge to some constants which are precisely a Wardrop equilibrium for the limit game. This provides stronger support to Wardrop's model as a sensible approximation for large games with many small players.
Section 4 deals with sequences of Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bernoulli congestion games when the participation probability of players tends to zero, and establishes their convergence to the set of Wardrop equilibria of another nonatomic game with suitably defined costs. This constitutes a novel alternative justification for Wardrop's model.
In both Sections 3 and 4 we provide nonasymptotic estimates for the distance between the sequence of equilibria and their limits, and we establish the convergence of the price of anarchy, as a measure of the inefficiency of equilibria.
In Section 5 we show that the nonatomic limit games in the case of Bernoulli demands are related to Poisson games as introduced by Myerson (1998b) . In fact, the Wardrop equilibria of the limit game are in one-to-one correspondence with the equilibria of an associated Poisson game. Poisson games were introduced axiomatically and not as a limit of a sequence of finite games. We close our paper by filling this gap, establishing a general result on convergence of sequences of games with Bernoulli demands (not necessarily congestion games) towards Poisson games.
1.2. Related literature. Although the convergence of congestion games to nonatomic games has been considered in the past, most of the previous work assumed that players can split their weight over the available strategies. Haurie and Marcotte (1985) were the first to deal with issues of convergence for atomic splittable routing games, Milchtaich (2000) studied the convergence of replicas of crowding games, Jacquot and Wan (2018) considered splittable routing on parallel networks with heterogenous players, and Jacquot and Wan (2019) studied the approximation of nonatomic aggregative games by a sequence of finite splittable games. The relation between Nash equilibria and a Wardrop-like notion of equilibrium in aggregative games with finitely many players, was also studied recently by Paccagnan et al. (2019) .
Several old papers considered the stochastic aspects of traffic, both theoretically and empirically, and the role of the Poisson distribution for modeling it (see, e.g., Adams, 1936 , Mayne, 1954 , Oliver, 1961 , Buckley, 1967 , Miller, 1970 . More recently, various authors have studied congestion games with stochastic features, focusing on the efficiency of equilibria under incomplete information. For instance, Gairing et al. (2008) studied the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games in which the weight of a player is private information. Looking at the cost uncertainty, Nikolova and Stier-Moses (2014) and Piliouras et al. (2016) considered players' risk attitudes in the nonatomic and atomic cases, respectively. Roughgarden (2015) showed that whenever player types are independent, the inefficiency bounds for complete information games extend to Bayesian Nash equilibria of the incomplete information game. Wang et al. (2014) and Correa et al. (2019) looked at similar questions for nonatomic routing games. This trend does not only include congestion games: Stidham (2014) studied the efficiency of some classical queueing models on various networks, whereas Hassin et al. (2018) examined a queueing model with heterogeneous agents and studied how the inefficiency of equilibria varies with the intensity function.
Closer to the scope of the present paper, Angelidakis et al. (2013) consider congestion games with stochastic players that are risk-averse, restricting their attention to the case of parallel edges. In the same spirit, Cominetti et al. (2019) consider Bernoulli congestion games, where each player i takes part in the game independently with probability p i , and find sharp bounds for the price of anarchy as a function of the maximum p i .
Games with random number of players were introduced by Myerson (1998a Myerson ( ,b, 2000 Myerson ( , 2002 , with the main goal of analyzing elections with a large number of voters. His seminal paper Myerson (1998b) shows that the case where the number of players has a Poisson distribution is of particular relevance, as it is the only case where environmental equivalence holds, i.e., the belief of a player of any type about the type profile of the other active players coincides with the belief of an external game theorist. Myerson (2000) deals with large Poisson games, i.e., games where the parameter of the Poisson distribution diverges. His approach differs from ours in the sense that he starts with a Poisson distribution, axiomatically justified, and lets the expectation of this distribution go to infinity. In our case we start with a finite number of players and let their number diverge in such a way that in the limit we get a Poisson distribution, but not necessarily with a large parameter. The asymptotic approach we take to Poisson games is based on results from Poisson approximation theory. In probability, articles about this topic abound. For an overview of this literature, we refer the reader to the books and surveys by Barbour et al. (1992) , Barbour and Chen (2005) , Novak (2019) .
Several other papers have studied the properties of games with random number of players and Poisson games in particular. Among them, Milchtaich (2004) provides a sophisticated analysis of general games with a random number of players. De Pimienta (2009), De Sinopoli et al. (2014) , Meroni and Pimienta (2017) deal with various properties of equilibria in Poisson games, such as stability and existence of equilibria in undominated strategies. Other papers apply Poisson games in different settings, not necessarily related to elections. For instance, Lim and Matros (2009) study contests with finitely many players, where each player takes part in the game independently with the same probability, while Du and Gong (2016) use a Poisson game to model parking congestion and propose a decentralized and coordinated online parking mechanism to reduce congestion. Let us finally mention Kordonis and Papavassilopoulos (2015) and Bernhard and Deschamps (2017) who study dynamic games where players arrive at random over time.
C
Informally, a congestion game is played over a set of resources whose costs depend on the mass of players using the resource. Each player chooses a subset of resources among the allowed subsets, seeking to achieve the minimum possible cost. Throughout this paper we consider a fixed finite set of resources E , where each e ∈ E is associated with a weakly increasing continuous cost function c e : R + → R + . We also fix a finite set of types T where each type t ∈ T is associated with a set of feasible actions S t ⊆ 2 E , which describes the pure strategies.
To name a standard example of a congestion game, routing games capture the topology of a network structure. Games of this family are defined over the set of edges of a finite graph encoded by E , and the set of origin-destination (OD) pairs encoded by T . The set of actions S t contains the feasible paths for the OD pair representing type t.
The structural objects
will be the same in all the congestion games considered hereafter, and the only differences will be in how we describe the set of players and their behavior. In the nonatomic framework, players are considered to be infinitesimally small and the model is stated in terms of the aggregate mass of players that use each strategy and resource. In contrast, for weighted congestion games, as well as for Bernoulli congestion games, we have a finite set of players who behave strategically. The rest of this section describes the three different models precisely.
As a guide for the notation used in the sequel, we write △(S t ) for the simplex of all probability distributions over the strategy set S t . We use capital letters for random variables and lower case for their expected values. For instance, X e will represent a random load on a resource e ∈ E with expected value x e = E[X e ], and we will add a hat x e when referring to an equilibrium.
2.1. Nonatomic congestion games. A nonatomic congestion game (NCG) is given by a pair Γ ∞ = (G , d), where G stands for the structural objects of the game as in Eq. (2.1), and d = (d t ) t ∈T is a vector of demands with d t ≥ 0 representing the aggregate demand of type t. The total demand is given by the sum over all types d tot = t ∈T d t . Each demand d t splits over the corresponding strategies S t and induces loads on the resources. Specifically, a strategy flow vector ≔ ( t,s ) t ∈T , s∈S t and a resource load vector x ≔ (x e ) e∈E are called feasible if they satisfy the following constraints:
(2.2b)
The set of such feasible flow-load pairs ( , x) is denoted by F (d). Note that the resource loads are uniquely defined by the strategy flows, but not vice versa. Nevertheless, instead of only considering strategy flows, we will refer to flow-load pairs since some concepts are easier to express in terms of flows while others are defined in terms of loads. The notation and nomenclature is inspired by network games, and most of our examples will be of this type since they are intuitive and well-studied. However, we will use these terms in the more general setting of congestion games, even when there is no network structure of resources and strategies.
A Wardrop equilibrium (WE) is defined as a feasible flow-load pair ( , x) ∈ F (d) for which the prevailing cost of all used strategies is minimal, or, mathematically,
Since, for each type, only strategies with minimum cost are used, all the used strategies have the same cost. As a consequence, any strategy flow decomposition of x yields an equilibrium. The set of Wardrop equilibria of the game Γ ∞ will be denoted by WE(Γ ∞ ).
Weighted congestion games.
A weighted congestion game (WCG) is defined as a tuple
where N is a finite set of players and each player i ∈ N has a weight w i ∈ R + and a type t i ∈ T that determines her strategy set S t i . Our use of the term "type" slightly differs from what is common in game theory, where a type is a random variable associated to each player, whose distribution is common knowledge but whose realization is private information.
Here, the players' types are deterministic and the type of each player is common knowledge. The aggregate demand for each type t and the total demand are given by
Let σ = (σ i ) i∈N be a mixed strategy profile, where σ i ∈ △(S t i ) represents the mixed strategy used by player i ∈ N , and let Σ ≔ × i∈N △(S t i ) be the set of mixed strategy profiles. Call E σ the expectation with respect to the product probability measure P σ ≔ ⊗ i∈N σ i over the set of pure strategy profiles S = × i∈N S t i . If S i is the random strategy of player i, whose distribution is σ i , then the probability that player i uses a given resource e is
(2.5) Accordingly, the strategy flows Y t,s and the resource loads X e become random variables
7b)
A straightforward calculation shows that the pair ( , x) satisfies Eq. (2.2), so that ( , x) ∈ F (d).
To take the perspective of a fixed player i, we assume the player already selected resource e and define the conditional load
(2.8)
Using this, the expected cost of player i conditioned on the player using the resource e is
(2.10)
The set of mixed Nash equilibria of Γ W is denoted by MNE(Γ W ).
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When all the players have the same weight w i ≡ w, Rosenthal (1973) showed that Γ W is a potential game and, as a consequence, pure Nash equilibria (PNE) are guaranteed to exist (see also Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Moreover, Fotakis et al. (2005) showed that every weighted congestion game with affine costs admits an exact potential. Conversely, Harks et al. (2011) proved that if C is a class of cost functions such that every weighted congestion game with costs in C admits a potential, then C only contains affine functions. Existence of pure equilibria in weighted congestion games was further studied by Harks and Klimm (2012) . Beyond these cases, one can only establish existence of equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, 1950) .
2.3. Bernoulli congestion games. In a weighted congestion game the randomness arises only from the players' mixed strategies. In this section, we add another stochastic element: players may not be present in the game. A Bernoulli congestion game (BCG) is a congestion game in which each player i ∈ N has a unit weight w i ≡ 1, but takes part in the game only with some probability r i ∈ (0, 1) and otherwise remains inactive and incurs no cost. The participation events, assumed to be independent, are encoded in random variables
The framework is similar to a weighted congestion game in which the w i 's are replaced by random weights U i ∈ {0, 1} with expected value r i , so that the per-type demands become the random variables D t = i:t i =t U i with expected values d t = E[D t ] = i:t i =t r i . The formulas are therefore very similar, with w i replaced by U i , or by r i when taking expectations. Nevertheless, we will see later on that the two classes of games behave differently in some respects.
Let σ = (σ i ) i∈N ∈ Σ describe the profile of mixed strategies used by each player. We assume that each player chooses her mixed strategy before knowing whether she will participate. Now randomness is induced both by the random participation and by the mixed strategies. This is described by a discrete probability space (Ω, 2 Ω , P σ ), where Ω = {0, 1} N ×S with S = × i∈N S t i as before, and P σ is now the probability measure induced by σ and by the random participation of players; that is, for u ∈ {0, 1} N and s ∈ S we have
(2.11)
with P i (1) = r i and P i (0) = 1 − r i . The corresponding expectation operator will be denoted E σ . As before, 1 {e∈S i } is a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether the random strategy S i includes resource e, with the notation in Eq. (2.5) still in place. Additionally, let U i,e = U i 1 {e∈S i } indicate whether player i is active and chooses resource e, for which we have E σ [U i,e ] = r i σ i,e . Then, the total number of active players of type t ∈ T using strategy s ∈ S t , and the total load on resource e ∈ E , are now the random variables
The expected strategy flows and resource loads are
When U i,e = 1, conditional on player i selecting resource e ∈ E , its load is X i,e = 1 +Z i,e , where Z i,e represents the number of other players using that resource, that is
(2.14)
Then the conditional expected cost for player i ∈ N when using this resource is
Notice that in this setting all players have unit weight so that the resource loads are integer-valued and therefore the costs c e : N → R + need only be defined over the integers.
( 2.16) The set of all Bayesian Nash equilibria of Γ B is denoted by BNE(Γ B ).
Remark 2.1. Cominetti et al. (2019, Proposition 3 .3) showed that Γ B is a potential game with potential function Φ : S → R given by
where N e (s) = i:e∈s i U i . The existence of such a potential drives the class of BCGs apart from the class of WCGs, which admits a potential only in special cases. In particular, a BCG always has equilibria in pure strategies. However, here we will consider both pure and mixed equilibria.
2.4. Price of anarchy and price of stability. To understand how the additional variability induced by player participation affects congestion games, we would like to understand if the ensuing equilibria are closer to optimality than in other games. Previous research looked at deterministic atomic and nonatomic congestion games as defined in earlier sections. Cominetti et al. (2019) looked at the case of finite games with stochastic player participation. Here, we extend the analysis to look at the limits of games when the number of players increases. For this analysis we need to be able to measure the social cost in the congestion games, which is defined as the sum of all costs. This provides us with a yardstick with which we can quantify the efficiency of equilibria as first proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) . The price of anarchy (PoA) is the worst-case ratio of the social cost of the equilibrium to the optimum. Here, worst case is with respect to all possible equilibria. Instead, the price of stability (PoS) is defined accordingly with respect to the best equilibria.
Starting with NCGs, their social cost (SC) is given by
. It is well-known (see Beckmann et al., 1956 ) that, whenever the cost functions c e are weakly increasing, all Wardrop equilibria have the same social cost so that defining Eq(Γ ∞ ) ≔ SC( , x) for any ( , x) ∈ WE(Γ ∞ ), it follows that the PoA and PoS for a nonatomic game coincide and are given by
The corresponding definitions for WCGs and BCGs are similar, adjusted for the fact that now these games include stochastic realizations. The expected social cost (ESC) is
( 2.20) where (X e ) e∈E are the random resource loads induced by the mixed strategy profile σ . The optimum cost is Opt(Γ) ≔ min σ ∈Σ ESC(σ ), and the social optimum is σ ∈ arg min σ ∈Σ ESC(σ ).
Defining the best and worst social costs at equilibrium,
we compute the price of anarchy and stability as:
(2.24)
C
Now that we laid out the games we are considering, we study the convergence of WCGs to NCGs when the number of players increases and their weights decrease. The only stochastic element appearing in this section is the fact that players randomize by considering mixed strategies. Under mild and natural conditions, we prove that equilibria converge as there are more players in the game, and that the optimal social cost, as well as the PoA, converge to the corresponding values for the limit nonatomic game. We also compute the speed of convergence for these limits.
Sequences of weighted congestion games. Consider a sequence of WCGs
The elements that vary over the sequence are the set N n of players, their weights w n i , and their types t n i . We want to study if and how the equilibria for this sequence converge. All the notations in Section 2.2 will remain in place, by simply adding the superscript n.
We assume that the number of players goes to infinity, while the sequence of weights goes to zero in such a way that the aggregate demand for each type converges. In other words, as there are more players, no player becomes dominant and the demands remain bounded. This is 9 captured by the following asymptotic behavior as n → ∞:
(3.2c)
We will show that, under these conditions, the random loads at equilibrium for the sequence of games Γ n W converge to the loads of Wardrop equilibria of a corresponding nonatomic limit game. Theorem 3.1. Let Γ n W be a sequence of WCGs satisfying the assumptions in Eq. (3.2) and let σ n ∈ MNE(Γ n W ) be an arbitrary sequence of mixed Nash equilibria. Then the corresponding sequence of expected flow-load pairs ( n , x n ) is bounded and every accumulation point
. Furthermore, along every convergent subsequence the random flow-load pairs (Y n , X n ) converge in distribution to ( , x).
Proof. As for every mixed strategy profile, the expected flow-load pair ( n , x n ) belongs to F (d n ) so that we have Eq. (2.2), adding the superindex n to all the terms involved. Since d n t → d t , it follows from Eq. (2.2) that the sequence ( n , x n ) is bounded, and then passing to the limit in these equations we conclude that every accumulation point ( , x) belongs to F (d).
For simplicity of notation, take a convergent subsequence and rename it so that the full sequence converges ( n , x n ) → ( , x). From Eq. (2.6) we get
It can be shown similarly that
and Var σ n [X n e ] → 0, from which convergence in distribution follows. It remains to show that ( , x) is a WE, that is, we need to establish Eq. (2.3). If t,s > 0, then, for n large enough, we have n t,s > 0 and there exists some player i ∈ N n of type t n i = t with σ n i (s) > 0. Note that i actually depends on n, so we should write i n . We omit the superscript for the sake of simplicity. The equilibrium condition in Γ n W implies that, for each alternative strategy s ′ ∈ S t and for this player i,
(3.6)
Since |X n i,e − X n e | ≤ w n i ≤ w n → 0, it follows that X n i,e → x e in distribution. Moreover, the loads X n e ≥ 0 are bounded above by the total demands d n tot = t ∈T d n t , which converge to d tot = t ∈T d t , so that both X n e and X n i,e are uniformly bounded. It follows that E σ n [c e (X n i,e )] → c e ( x e ) and, letting n → ∞ in Eq. (3.6), we obtain Eq. (2.3) as required.
For games with strictly-increasing cost functions c e ( · ) the equilibrium loads x e are unique, even if Γ ∞ admits several WE. As an immediate consequence, the following corollary refines the previous theorem to the unique loads.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that the resource costs c e ( · ) are strictly increasing. Then, for every sequence Γ n W of WCGs satisfying Eq. (2.2) and each sequence σ n ∈ MNE(Γ n W ), the random loads X n e converge in distribution to the unique Wardrop equilibrium loads x e of the nonatomic limit game
Example 3.1. We illustrate the previous result on the Wheatstone network shown in Fig. 2 . There is a single OD pair and n ≥ 2 identical players, each one with weight w i ≡ 1/n so that the total demand is d tot = 1. For each n, there is a unique symmetric pure Nash equilibrium in which
all players take the zig-zag path e 1 , e 3 , e 5 and pay a cost equal to 2. For n = 2, we also have a pure equilibrium in which one player takes the upper path while the other takes the lower path, and they both pay 3/2. For n ≥ 3, the only mixed equilibrium (modulo permutation of the players) is when n − 1 players take the zig-zag path and the last player mixes in any possible way over the three paths. In the limit when n → ∞, all these equilibria converge to the WE of the corresponding nonatomic game with a unit flow over the zig-zag path.
3.2. Rate of convergence. The previous results showed that the random loads X n e in the finite games converge in distribution to the WE loads x e . Under a mild additional assumption, we can find nonasymptotic estimates for the speed of convergence. Our assumption calls for a lower bound on the derivative of the cost functions. This basically excludes constant cost functions, which are not likely to appear in applications. 1 We start by establishing some estimates for the distance between Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic games with different demands, as well as between exact and approximate equilibria. We recall that an ε-approximate Wardrop equilibrium ( , x) ∈ F (d), or ε-WE, is defined exactly like a WE but with an additive constant:
Proposition 3.3. Let ( , x) be a WE for a nonatomic congestion game Γ ∞ with d tot ≤ α. Suppose that there exists β > 0 such that c ′ e (x) ≥ β for all e ∈ E and x ∈ [0, α], and let Ξ = 2C/β with C = max s e∈s c e (α), where the maximum is taken over all the feasible strategies s ∈ ∪ t ∈T S t .
(
where in the second inequality we dropped the sum e∈E c e ( x e )(x e − x e ), which is nonnegative since ( , x) is a WE for Γ ∞ and ( , x) ∈ F (d), while the subsequent equalities follow by expressing the resource loads in terms of the strategy flows and exchanging the order of summation, and then using the fact that both ( , x) and ( , x) are feasible. Now, using Eq. (3.7), we conclude
(b) Proceeding as in the previous part, we have
Let the two sums in the RHS be denoted by Ψ( x ′ , x) and Ψ( x, x ′ ), respectively. To bound Ψ( x ′ , x), we exploit the fact that x ′ is a WE for the demand d ′ . Since ( , x) is feasible for d, but not for d ′ , for each type t with d t > 0 we consider the rescaled flows t,s = t,s d ′ t /d t , whereas when d t = 0 we simply take t,s = ′ t,s . Letting x e = t ∈T s∈S t t,s 1 {e∈s } denote the corresponding resource loads, we have that ( , x) ∈ F (d ′ ), and therefore
where in the inequality we dropped the first sum which is nonpositive since ( ′ , x ′ ) is a WE and ( , x) is feasible for d ′ , whereas the last equality follows by expressing the resource loads in terms of the strategy flows and exchanging the order of the sums. We now analyze each term in the outer sum over t ∈ T . When d t > 0 the inner double sum can be bounded as
whereas, when d t = 0, we have t,s = ′ t,s and t,s = 0 so that
from which the result follows. Using Proposition 3.3(a), we can prove that a mixed Nash equilibrium σ for a weighted congestion game Γ W is close to a Wardrop equilibrium in the corresponding nonatomic game Γ ∞ with the same aggregate demands. Let X e be the random loads in a mixed Nash equilibrium σ ∈ MNE(Γ W ), and let x e be the unique resource loads in the Wardrop equilibrium for the nonatomic game Γ ∞ = (G , (d t ) t ∈T ) with the same aggregate demands as Γ W . Then, letting w = max i∈N w i , we have
with
With this bound in place, we proceed to estimate |x e − x e | by showing that ( , x) is an ε-WE with ε = 2κ(ζ + γ α/4)w.
(3.12)
To this end, we first observe that a second order expansion of the costs c e ( · ) allows us to get the maximum bias of the cost: Now, if t,s > 0, then there exists some player i ∈ N with t i = t and σ i (s) > 0, so that the equilibrium condition in Γ W implies that for each alternative strategy s ′ ∈ S t we have
(3.15) Now, since |X i,e − X e | ≤ w and c e ( · ) is ζ -Lipschitz, by using (3.14) we get Combining the previous results we obtain an explicit estimate for the L 2 distance between the random resource loads X n e in a sequence of mixed Nash equilibria for Γ n W , and the loads in the Wardrop equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game Γ ∞ .
Corollary 3.5. Let Γ n W be a sequence of WCGs satisfying Eq. (3.2) with d n tot ≤ α for all n. Let the costs c e (·) and Θ be as in Theorem 3.4, and take Ξ as in Proposition 3.3. Let X n e be the random loads in a sequence of mixed Nash equilibria σ n ∈ MNE(Γ n W ), and x e the unique resource loads in the WE for the nonatomic limit game Γ ∞ = (G , (d t ) t ∈T ). Then, with w n defined as in Eq. (3.2b), we have
Proof. Take ( n , x n ) a Wardrop equilibrium for the nonatomic game Γ ∞ with demands d n . A triangle inequality gives X n e − x e L 2 ≤ X n e − x n e L 2 + | x n e − x e |, so the result follows from the estimate X n e − x n e L 2 ≤ Θ √ w n in Theorem 3.4, and the bound | x n e − x e | ≤ Ξ d n − d 1 from Proposition 3.3(b).
3.3.
Convergence of the price of anarchy. In this section, we investigate the convergence of the PoA for the sequence Γ n W . Although we already know from the previous sections that the sequence of equilibria converges, we need to prove that the associated social cost converges, besides also proving that the sequence of optimal social costs also converges. To this end, we start by proving that for any sequence of converging expected flow-load pairs, the social cost of the sequence converges to that of the limiting flow-load pair.
Lemma 3.6. Let Γ n W be a sequence of WCGs satisfying the conditions in Eq. (3.2), and σ n an arbitrary sequence of mixed strategy profiles (not necessarily equilibria). Let (Y n t,s , X n e ) be the corresponding random flow-load pairs with expected values ( n t,s , x n e ). Then, along any subsequence of ( n , x n ) converging to some ( , x), the expected social cost ESC(σ n ) converges to SC( , x) = e∈E x e c e (x e ).
Proof. Take a convergent subsequence and rename it so that ( n , x n ) → ( , x). By conditioning on 1 n i,e ≔ 1 {e∈S n i } , which indicates whether player i selects a strategy including e, we get ESC(σ n ) = e∈E i∈N n E σ n w n i 1 n i,e c e (X n e ) = e∈E i∈N n w n i σ n i,e E σ n c e (X n i,e ) .
(3.20)
Note that |X n i,e − X n e | ≤ w n → 0 and 0 ≤ X n e ≤ d n tot with d n tot → d tot . Since c e ( · ) is continuous, and hence uniformly continuous on compact intervals, it follows that E σ n [c e (X n i,e )] − E σ n [c e (X n e )] converges to 0 uniformly in i, that is, δ n e ≔ max i∈N n E σ n c e (X n i,e ) − E σ n c e (X n e ) → 0.
(3.21)
Hence, using the identity
we obtain
x n e δ n e + E σ n c e (X n e ) − c e (x n e ) .
The conclusion follows since x n e → x e and X n e D − → x e , so that E σ n c e (X n e ) → c e (x e ). With this, we are ready to prove the convergence of optima.
Proposition 3.7. Let Γ n W be a sequence of WCGs satisfying the conditions in Eq. (3.2). Then Opt(Γ n W ) → Opt(Γ ∞ ).
(3.23)
Proof. Let ( , x) be a social optimum flow-load pair in the limiting game Γ ∞ . We convert the strategy flow into mixed strategies σ t ∈ △(S t ) by setting ∀s ∈ S t σ t (s) = t,s /d t (3.24) when d t > 0, and otherwise taking an arbitrary σ t ∈ △(S t ) for each type with d t = 0.
Let σ n be the strategy profile for Γ n W in which player i plays σ n i = σ t n i . For each t such that d t = 0 we have n t,s → 0 = t,s for all s ∈ S t , whereas when d t > 0 we have Now, take a sequence σ n of optimal mixed strategies in Γ n W and let ( n , x n ) be the corresponding expected loads. From the optimality of σ n we have ESC( σ n ) ≤ ESC( σ n ), so that lim sup
On the other hand, taking a subsequence along which we attain the lim inf n→∞ ESC( σ n ) and extracting a further subsequence so that ( n , x n ) converges to a certain limit ( , x), it follows that
which, combined with Eq. (3.26), yields the result.
We finish our analysis of WCGs with the convergence of the cost of equilibria and therefore that of the price of anarchy.
Theorem 3.8. Let Γ n W be a sequence of WCG satisfying the conditions in Eq. (3.2) and let σ n ∈ MNE(Γ n W ). Then, ESC( σ n ) → Eq(Γ ∞ ), and therefore PoA(Γ n W ) → PoA(Γ ∞ ) and PoS(Γ n W ) → PoA(Γ ∞ ). Proof. Every accumulation point of ( n , x n ) is a WE for Γ ∞ ; hence, by Lemma 3.6, the full sequence ESC( σ n ) converges to Eq(Γ ∞ ) as n → ∞.
Example 3.2. Consider the sequence of games in Example 3.1 and the different equilibria already described there. The social cost is minimized by splitting half of the players between the upper and lower paths (up to 1 player when n is odd). So for n = 2, we have PoA(Γ n ) = 4/3 and PoS(Γ n ) = 1, whereas for n ≥ 3, by setting δ n = 1 if n is odd and δ n = 0 otherwise, we get
and both converge to PoA(Γ ∞ ) = PoS(Γ ∞ ) = 4/3 as n → ∞.
C B
4.1. Sequences of Bernoulli congestion games. In this section we analyze the convergence of a sequence of BCGs
The elements that vary over the sequence are the set N n of players, their participation probabilities r n i , and their types t n i , as well as the underlying probability spaces encoding the random participation of players and their mixed strategies. We proceed to study the convergence of a corresponding sequence of Bayes-Nash equilibria σ n ∈ BNE(Γ n B ). We assume that the number of players goes to infinity while the sequence of participation probabilities goes to zero in such a way that the aggregate expected demand for each type converges. This is captured by the following asymptotic behavior as n → ∞:
Let Y n t,s and X n e be given by Eq. (2.12), with U i = U n i , t i = t n i , and S i = S n i drawn independently at random according to σ n i . As before, let ( n , x n ) be the vector of expected loads and observe that 16 from Eq. (2.13) it follows that d n t = s∈S t n t,s , (4.3a)
x n e = t ∈T s∈S t n t,s 1 {e∈s } .
(4.3b)
Our analysis is based on results on Poisson approximations for sums of Bernoulli random variables. We recall that a sequence of probability measures Q n on N converges in total variation to the probability measure Q, written as
Similarly, a sequence of random variablesT n converges in total variation to T if L (T n ) TV − − → L (T ). It is known that, under the conditions in Eq. (4.2), the per-type demands D n t = i : t n i =t U n i converge in total variation to a Poisson variable D t ∼ Poisson(d t ) (see, e.g., Adell and Lekuona, 2005 , Corollary 3.1). For instance, in the simple case where the probabilities of taking part in the game are the same for all players i of type t, say r n i = d t /N n t , with N n t = |{i ∈ N n : t n i = t }|, we have D n t ∼ Binomial(N n t , d t /N n t ), which is well known to converge to D t ∼ Poisson(d t ) as N n t → ∞. Appendix A collects some further results that are used in our analysis.
Proposition 4.1. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCGs satisfying the conditions in Eq. (4.2), and let σ n be an arbitrary sequence of mixed strategy profiles. Then (a) The sequence ( n , x n ) n∈N is bounded and each accumulation point ( , x) belongs to F (d).
(b) Along any convergent subsequence of ( n , x n ), the random flows Y n t,s and loads X n e converge in total variation to Y t,s ∼ Poisson( t,s ) and X e ∼ Poisson(x e ), respectively. (c) The limit variables (Y t,s ) t ∈T ,s∈S t are independent.
Proof. (a) Since the expected demands d n t are convergent, this follows directly from Eq. (4.3). (b) Take a convergent subsequence and for simplicity rename it to be the full sequence ( n , x n ) → ( , x). Note that Theorem A.4(a) gives ρ TV L (X n e ), L (V n e ) ≤ r n , (4.5)
where V n e ∼ Poisson(x n e ), and then, using the triangle inequality and Eq. (A.2), we conclude ρ TV L (X n e ), L (X e ) ≤ r n + |x n e − x e | → 0.
(4.6)
A similar argument shows that Y n t,s converges in total variation to Y t,s . (c) Consider the joint moment generating function M n of the random variables Y n t,s
where λ = (λ t,s ) t ∈T ,s∈S t . Since
and U n i 1 {s n i =s } are independent across players and types (although not across strategies), we have
Taking logarithms and using the fact that ln(1 + ) = + O( 2 ), it follows that
In view of the conditions in Eq. (4.2) the sum i∈N n O((r n i ) 2 ) converges to zero, and, as a consequence, lim
which is the moment generating function of a family of independent Poisson random variables with parameters t,s . For these costs to be finite and smooth, we impose the following mild assumption:
where ∆ 2 c e (k) = c e (k + 2) − 2c e (k + 1) + c e (k). This condition holds in particular for costs with subexponential growth c e (k) ≤ b exp(ak) for some a, b ∈ R + , which includes all polynomials. The condition fails for rapidly growing functions such as factorials c e (k) = k! or double exponentials c e (k) = exp(exp(k)). The following is the main consequence of Eq. (4.11) used in the sequel.
Lemma 4.2. Assume Eq. (4.11) and let ζ = (e α −1)ν + max e∈E [c e (2) − c e (1)]. Then, the auxiliary costsc e ( · ) are finite and of class C 2 on [0, α] with 0 ≤c ′ e (x) ≤ ζ for all x ∈ [0, α]. Moreover, let Γ B be a BCG with d tot ≤ α and let r = max i∈N r i . Let X e be the random loads in a mixed strategy profile σ , and Z i,e = X e − U i,e the loads excluding player i. Then, the expected values x e = E σ [X e ] and z i,e = E σ [Z i,e ] satisfy |z i,e − x e | = E σ [U i,e ] ≤ r , and we have
(4.12)
Proof. The smoothness and the bound 0 ≤c ′ e (x) ≤ ζ for the auxiliary costs follow directly from Proposition A.2(b) and Corollary A.3 in the Appendix. In particular,c e (·) is ζ -Lipschitz, and then Eq. (4.12) follows by using a triangle inequality and Theorem A.4(b) .
We proceed to prove that the random loads at the equilibrium of games with Bernoulli demands converge to a Wardrop equilibrium for the nonatomic congestion gameΓ ∞ = (G , (d t ) t ∈T ) defined by the costsc e (·) and the limiting demands d t .
Theorem 4.3. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCGs satisfying Eqs. (4.2) and (4.11), and let σ n ∈ BNE(Γ n B ) be an arbitrary sequence of Bayesian Nash equilibria. Then the corresponding sequence of expected flow-load pairs ( n , x n ) is bounded and every accumulation point ( , x) is a Wardrop equilibrium for the nonatomic congestion gameΓ ∞ . Furthermore, along every such convergent subsequence the random flows Y n t,s and loads X n e converge in total variation to Poisson limits Y t,s ∼ Poisson( t,s ) and X e ∼ Poisson( x e ), where the variables Y t,s are independent.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, it suffices to show that every accumulation point is a WE forΓ ∞ . Take a convergent subsequence and rename it to be the full sequence ( n , x n ) → ( , x). We must prove that, for each type t and each pair of strategies s, s ′ in S t , we have t,s > 0 ⇒ e∈sc e ( x e ) ≤ e∈s ′c e ( x e ).
(4.13)
A strict inequality t,s > 0 implies that for all n large enough we have n t,s > 0 and there must be a player i = i n of type t n i = t with σ n i (s) > 0. The equilibrium condition in Γ n B implies that for each alternative strategy s ′ ∈ S t for player i we have
(4.14)
Using Lemma 4.2, we get E σ n c e (1 + Z n i,e ) −c e (x n e ) ≤ Λ(r n ) → 0, (4.15) and, since x n e → x e , it follows that E σ n [c e (1 + Z n i,e )] →c e ( x e ). Thus, letting n → ∞ in Eq. (4.14), we obtain Eq. (4.13).
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3 and Corollary A.3(b) whenever the equilibrium loads of the corresponding nonatomic game are unique.
Corollary 4.4. Let c e : N → R be weakly increasing and nonconstant for k ≥ 1 and assume that the conditions Eq. (4.11) hold. Then, the extended functionsc e ( · ) are strictly increasing and the loads x e are the same in every WE forΓ ∞ . Moreover, for every sequence Γ n B of BCGs satisfying the conditions in Eq. (4.2) and every sequence σ n ∈ BNE(Γ n B ), the random loads X n e converge in total variation to a random variable X e ∼ Poisson( x e ).
Example 4.1. Consider a sequence (Γ n B ) n∈N of games played on the Wheatstone network in Fig. 2 , with n identical players and r i ≡ r = 1/n so that the total expected demand is d tot = 1. Notice that the conditional expected cost of a player i ∈ N when using e 1 or e 5 equals 1 + r (x − 1), where x is the number of players using the edge. It follows that the zig-zag path (e 1 , e 3 , e 5 ) is strictly dominated by a linear combination of the upper and lower paths, and no player will use the zigzag path. This is in sharp contrast with the weighted congestion games described in Example 3.1, where all but one players were choosing the zig-zag path. This difference is explained by the fact that each player has a unit weight and has a significant impact on the costs.
If the number of players n = 2k is even, there is a unique PNE (modulo permutations of players), where half of the players choose the upper path and the other half take the lower path. In this equilibrium, the expected cost for each player is (2.5 − n −1 )/n. For an odd number of players n = 2k + 1, there is a Nash equilibrium (NE) where each edge gets k players for sure, and the last player randomizes arbitrarily between these two paths. For all n, there is also a symmetric mixed equilibrium where every player mixes with q = 1/2 between the upper and lower paths, and the expected cost of each player is (2.5 − (2n) −1 )/n. In general, one can prove that every MNE is of the form where k 1 players take the upper path, k 2 players take the lower path, and the remaining k 3 = n − k 1 − k 2 players, with k 3 − 1 > |k 2 − k 1 |, randomize between these two paths with exactly the same probabilities (q, 1 − q) with
so as to equalize their costs. As n → ∞, all these equilibria converge to a WE of a nonatomic game where the costs of e 1 and e 5 become 1 + x. In this WE, half of the demand goes on the upper path and the remaining half on the lower path. 4.3. Rate of convergence. Eq. (4.6) provides a bound on the distance between the resourceloads in the finite games Γ n B and the Poisson limits. Since r n is a primitive parameter of the model, its proximity to zero is readily available. In contrast, the second term | x n e − x e | is only known to converge to zero asymptotically. Similar to Section 3.2, we can find nonasymptotic estimates for the speed of convergence under a mild additional assumption.
We first show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ for a Bernoulli congestion game Γ B is close to a Wardrop equilibrium for the nonatomic gameΓ ∞ with the same aggregate demands. We do this by showing that the expected load-flow vectors ( , x) are in fact ε-approximate Wardrop equilibria inΓ ∞ for suitable ε.
Theorem 4.5. Let Γ B be a BCG with expected demands d t = i:t i =t r i and d tot ≤ α. Assume Eq. (4.11) and define Λ(r ) as in Eq. (4.12) with r = max i∈N r i . Suppose further thatc ′ e (x) ≥ β > 0 for all x ∈ [0, α], and letΘ = 2ακ/β with κ the size of the largest feasible strategy s ∈ ∪ t ∈T S t . Let X e be the random loads in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ ∈ BNE(Γ B ) with expected flow-loads ( , x), and X e ∼ Poisson( x e ) with x the unique Wardrop equilibrium loads in the nonatomic game 20 Γ ∞ with costsc e (·) and with the same aggregate demands d t as Γ B . Then, x − x 2 ≤Θ Λ(r ) and ρ TV L (X e ), L ( X e ) ≤ r +Θ Λ(r ).
(4.17)
Proof. The bound x − x 2 ≤Θ Λ(r ) follows from Proposition 3.3(a) since x is an ε-WE forΓ ∞ with ε = 2κΛ(r ). Indeed, if t,s > 0 there exists some player i ∈ N with t i = t and σ i (s) > 0, so that the equilibrium condition yields for all Remark 4.2. The assumptionc ′ e (x) ≥ β for x ∈ [0, α] holds when c e (k + 1) ≥ c e (k) + β for all e ∈ E and k ≥ 1. A milder condition is 0 < δ ≔ min e∈E c e (2) − c e (1) since then one can take β = δ e −α .
Using the previous result we may bound the distance between the random loads in a sequence Γ n B of BCGs and the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium in the limit gameΓ ∞ . Corollary 4.6. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCG satisfying the conditions in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.11), with total expected demands bounded as d n tot ≤ α for all n. Suppose thatc ′ e (x) ≥ β > 0 for all e ∈ E and x ∈ [0, α], and letΘ = 2ακ/β andΞ = 2C/β with κ the size of the largest feasible strategy s ∈ ∪ t ∈T S t and C = max s e∈sce (α). Let X n e be the random loads in a sequence of Bayes-Nash equilibria σ n ∈ BNE(Γ n B ), and X e ∼ Poisson( x e ) with x e the unique resource loads in the WE for the nonatomic limit gameΓ ∞ . Then, ρ TV L (X n e ), L (X e ) ≤ r n +Θ Λ(r n ) +Ξ d n − d 1 .
(4.19)
Proof. This follows by considering X n e ∼ Poisson( x n e ) with ( n , x n ) a Wardrop equilibrium for the gameΓ ∞ with demands d n , and then using a triangle inequality and applying Theorem 4.5 and Proposition 3.3(b).
4.4.
Convergence of the price of anarchy. We now investigate the convergence of the price of anarchy for the sequence Γ n B . To this end we exploit the following fact. Lemma 4.7. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCGs satisfying the conditions in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.11), and let σ n be an arbitrary sequence of mixed strategies. Let Y n t,s and X n e be the corresponding random loads with expected values n t,s and x n e . Then, along any subsequence of ( n , x n ) converging to some ( , x), the expected social cost ESC(σ n ) converges toS C( , x) ≔ e∈E x ece (x e ).
Proof. Take a convergent subsequence and rename it so that ( n , x n ) → ( , x). By conditioning on the event U n i,e = 1, we have ESC(σ n ) = e∈E i∈N n E σ n U n i,e c e (X n e ) = e∈E i∈N n r n i σ n i,e E σ n c e (1 + Z n i,e ) .
(4.20)
Using the identity x n e = i∈N n r n i σ n i,e and invoking Lemma 4.2, we obtain ESC(σ n ) − e∈E x n ec e (x n e ) ≤ e∈E i∈N n r n i σ n i,e E σ n [c e (1 + Z n i,e )] −c e (x n e ) ≤ e∈E i∈N n r n i σ n i,e Λ(r n ) = e∈E x n e Λ(r n ) → 0, and then the conclusion follows from x n e → x e and the continuity ofc e ( · ). Proposition 4.8. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCGs satisfying Eqs. (4.2) and (4.11). Then Opt(Γ n B ) → Opt(Γ ∞ ).
(4.21)
Proof. It suffices to repeat the proof of Proposition 3.7 step-by-step, replacing SC( · ) withS C( · ) and invoking Lemma 4.7 instead of Lemma 3.6.
From Lemma 4.2 we havec ′ e (x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, α] so that the extended costsc ′ e (·) are weakly increasing, and therefore the social cost SC( , x) ≡ Eq(Γ ∞ ) is the same in every WE. As in the case of WCGs we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let Γ n B be a sequence of BCGs satisfying the conditions in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.11). Then, for every sequence σ n ∈ BNE(Γ n B ), the expected social cost ESC( σ n ) converges to Eq(Γ ∞ ). As a consequence, both PoA(Γ n B ) and PoS(Γ n B ) converge to PoA(Γ ∞ ) = PoS(Γ ∞ ). Remark 4.3. For polynomial costs c e ( · ) of degree at most d we have thatc e (x) are again polynomials of the same degrees (though with different coefficients), so that the results in Roughgarden (2002 Roughgarden ( , 2003 imply
(4.22)
In fact, for d = 1, the bound PoA(Γ n B ) ≤ 4/3 is valid as soon as r n ≤ 1/4 (see Cominetti et al., 2019) . For higher degrees we conjecture the existence of a threshold for r n under which PoA(Γ n B ) already falls below the nonatomic bound B(d). The current result implies that we only have this as an asymptotic bound when r n → 0.
Example 4.2. Consider the sequence of games Γ n B in Example 4.1. The social cost is minimized by splitting half of the players between the upper and lower routes (up to 1 player when n is odd). Since this strategy profile is also a pure Nash equilibrium, we have PoS(Γ n B ) = 1 for all n ∈ N. As far as the PoA is concerned, the worst equilibrium occurs when each player chooses the upper and lower routes with equal probability 1/2. Setting δ n = 1/n when n is odd and δ n = 0 otherwise, we obtain
PoA(Γ n B ) = 5n − 1 5n − 2 + δ n (4.23) which converges to PoA(Γ ∞ ) = 1 as n → ∞.
Remark 4.4. The Examples 3.2 and 4.2 may suggest that the price of anarchy in the nonatomic game obtained as a limit of WCGs would be larger than the price of anarchy in the nonatomic limit game for the BCGs. This is not true in general. Consider for instance the Pigou network in Fig. 3 with a demand of 1. The WE of the standard nonatomic game is optimal, so PoA(Γ ∞ ) = 1. The WE of the nonatomic limit game of the Bernoulli game, in which the auxiliary cost function on the upper edge is nowc 1 (x) = 1 +x, sends all demand on the upper path, whereas in the social optimum (SO) the demand is split over the upper and lower path. So, we have that PoA(Γ ∞ ) = 8/7.
G P
In this final section we establish a connection between the nonatomic gameΓ ∞ obtained as a limit of Bernoulli congestion games, and Poisson games in the sense of Myerson (1998b) .
Let us first recall the concept of a game with population uncertainty (as first introduced by Myerson, 1998b) , which is given by a tuple Γ P = (T , (S t ) t ∈T , µ, C), where T is a finite set of types and each t ∈ T has an associated strategy set S t and a random number of players N t that take part in the game 2 . Players are not aware of the specific identities of the other players and they only know the joint probability distribution µ over N T according to which the number N = (N t ) t ∈T of players of each type t are drawn. This is why in these games players are treated symmetrically by assuming that all players of type t adopt the same mixed strategy σ t ∈ △(S t ), which only depends on their type. The cost C(Y −t | t, s) for an active player of type t chosing an action s ∈ S t , depends on the strategy flows Y −t induced by the other players present in the game, as described below.
The measure µ, together with σ = (σ t ) t ∈T , determines the distribution of the strategy flows Y = (Y t,s ) t ∈T ,s∈S t over types and strategies. Conditional on N t =n t the flows Y t = (Y t,s ) s∈S t for type t ∈ T are distributed on strategies as independent multinomials Y t ∼ Multinomial(n t , σ t ). Thus, if for each n = (n t,s ) t ∈T ,s∈S t , we definen ≔ (n t ) t ∈T withn t ≔ s∈S t n t,s , then we have
where P µ,σ is the probability measure induced by µ and σ . Now, consider a generic player of a given type t who happens to be active in the game, and let N −t = (N −t t ′ ) t ′ ∈T denote the random vector giving the number of other players for each type, excluding this active player. As shown by Myerson (1998b) (see also Milchtaich, 2004) , the posterior distribution of N −t assessed by such a generic player is given by
wheren+δ t denotes the vectorn withn t replaced byn t +1. Accordingly, the posterior distribution of the strategy flows Y −t = (Y −t t ′ ,s ) t ′ ∈T ,s∈S t ′ induced by the remaining active players is given by Eq. (5.1), with µ(n) replaced by µ(n | t).
The expected cost for a player of type t is computed according to this posterior distribution, and an equilibrium is then defined as a family of type-dependent mixed strategies σ = ( σ t ) t ∈T with σ t ∈ △(S t ) such that
Remark 5.1. The Bernoulli congestion games in Section 2.3 fall in the framework of games with population uncertainty where N t = i:t i =t U i is the sum of independent nonhomogeneous Bernoulli random variables. However, we considered not only strategies defined by the player's type, but also asymmetric equilibria in which players choose their strategies individually.
Example 5.1. Consider the game Γ n B on the Wheatstone network of Fig. 2 in Example 4.1. Recall that there are n players-all of the same type t-and each one is present with probability 1/n. Assume that all players play a mixed strategy in which with probability 1/2 they choose the upper path, and with probability 1/2 they choose the lower path. Let Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 ) denote the random vector that gives the number of players on the paths s 1 = (e 1 , e 4 ), s 2 = (e 1 , e 3 , e 5 ) and s 3 = (e 2 , e 5 ), respectively. Then Y 1 , Y 3 ∼ Binomial(n, (2n) −1 ) and Y 2 ≡ 0, while the corresponding posterior distributions are Y −t 1 , Y −t 3 ∼ Binomial(n − 1, (2n − 2) −1 ) and Y −t 2 ≡ 0. An important subclass of games with population uncertainty are the Poisson games which are characterized by independent variables N t ∼ Poisson(d t ), with d t > 0, that is,
It is not difficult to see that Poisson games are characterized by the fact that the posteriors µ( · | t) coincide with µ for every t ∈ T . Moreover, in this case the loads Y t,s are also independent with Y t,s ∼ Poisson(d t σ t (s)). In fact, as shown in Myerson (1998b, Theorem 1), in a game with population uncertainty the variables Y t,s are independent if and only if the game is Poisson. The nonatomic gameΓ ∞ in Section 4.2, obtained as a limit of a sequence of Bernoulli congestion games, can be interpreted as a Poisson game defined by the costs
We state this observation in the following result. wherec e (·) is defined as in Eq. (4.10).
Notice that the costs in Eq. (5.5) depend on the strategy flows Y −t only through the aggregate resource loads X −t e , whereas Myerson (1998b) considers more general cost functions C(Y −t | t, s).
However, to ensure that the expected costs are well defined, these costs were assumed bounded. In our case this boundedness assumption is relaxed and replaced by the conditions in Eq. (4.11).
On the other hand, as mentioned in the Introduction, Myerson (1998b) introduced Poisson games axiomatically and not as limits of a sequence of finite games. The following extension of Theorem 4.3, to the general setting of games with population uncertainty, fills this gap by establishing the convergence of sequences of games with Bernoulli players towards Poisson games. Let T be a finite set of types with strategy sets S t for t ∈ T . Consider a sequence of games Γ n with finitely many players i ∈ N n , with types t n i , and probabilities r n i of being active. Let U n i be Bernoulli random variables with P(U n i = 1) = r n i , and let player i choose S n i ∈ S t n i at random using a mixed strategy σ n i . Let Y n be the random vector of strategy flows Y n t,s = j : t n j =t U j 1 {S n j =s } , and define Y −i,n similarly by excluding player i. The expected cost of an action s ∈ S t n i for player i is given by E σ n [C(Y −i,n | t n i , s)] with C(· | t, s) a family of bounded functions. A Nash equilibrium σ n is defined as usual by the condition
(5.7)
Theorem 5.2. Consider a sequence Γ n as above, and assume the conditions in Eq. (4.2) with d t > 0.
Then, for every sequence σ n of Nash equilibria, the expected loads n t,s = E σ n [Y n t,s ] are bounded and each accumulation point = ( t,s ) t ∈T ,s∈S t corresponds to an equilibrium σ in the Poisson game by setting σ t (s) = t,s /d t for all s ∈ S t .
Proof. The boundedness of the expected strategy loads n t,s follows from s∈S t n t,s = d n t → d t . Take a convergent subsequence and rename it so that n → , and define σ as in the statement. If σ t (s) > 0 for some s ∈ S t , then t,s > 0, so that, for all n large we have n t,s > 0 and there must be a player i n ∈ N n with type t and σ n i n (s) > 0. The equilibrium condition for i n implies that
As in Proposition 4.1, it follows that the variables Y −i n ,n converge in total variation, and hence in distribution, to a random vector Y with independent Poisson components Y t,s ∼ Poisson( t,s ).
Letting n → ∞ in Eq. (5.8) we obtain Eq. (5.3), from which the result follows.
Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.2 remains valid when some of the demands converge to zero d n t → d t = 0, by considering the Poisson game restricted to the nontrivial types with d t > 0.
S
In this paper we studied the convergence of equilibria of atomic-unsplittable congestion games with an increasing number of players, towards a WE for a limiting nonatomic game. For the case where players have vanishing weights, the random loads (Y n , X n ) at a mixed equilibrium in the finite games were shown to converge in distribution to constant loads ( , x), which are a Wardrop equilibrium of the nonatomic congestion game. In contrast, if players have a fixed unit weight but are present in the game with vanishing probabilities, then (Y n , X n ) converge in total variation to Poisson variables (Y , X ), whose expected values ( , x) are again characterized as a WE for a nonatomic congestion game with auxiliary cost functions. In the latter case, the limit variables (Y , X ) can also be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium for a Poisson game in the sense of Myerson (1998b) .
These convergence results were completed by showing that in both frameworks the price of anarchy and the price of stability converge to the price of anarchy of the limit game. Under additional conditions we also established explicit estimates for the distance between the random loads (Y n , X n ) and their limits ( , x) and (Y , X ), respectively.
We did not address the combined case in which both the weights and the presence probabilities vary across players. Such situations may be relevant for routing games where cars and trucks have a different impact on traffic, or in the presence of heterogeneous drivers that may be slower or faster inducing more or less congestion. Other settings in which players are naturally heterogeneous arise in telecommunications, where packets come in different sizes, and in processor sharing, where tasks arriving to a server have different workloads. In such cases, one might still expect to obtain a limit game which is likely to yield a weighted nonatomic game, possibly involving weighted sums of Poisson distributions.
Another direction not explored in this paper concerns the case of oligopolistic competition in which some players, e.g., TomTom, Waze, FedEx, UPS, etc. may control a nonnegligible fraction of the demand, while simultaneously another fraction of the demand behaves as individual selfish players. A natural conjecture is that in the vanishing weight limit one may converge to a composite game as those studied in Sorin and Wan (2016) , with coexistence of atomic-splittable and nonatomic players. Similarly, in the case of fixed weights and vanishing probabilities one may expect to converge to some form of composite game involving Poisson random variables, which remains to be discovered.
Proof.
(a) Combining Propositions A.2(b) and A.1(a) we get |h ′′ (x)| ≤ e α−x ν, so that by integration it follows that |h ′ (x) −h ′ (0)| ≤ (e α − 1)ν, and we conclude sinceh ′ (0) = h(1) − h(0).
(b) This follows from Proposition A.2(b).
A.2. Poisson approximation for sums of Bernoulli random variables. Let S = X 1 +. . .+X n be a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables with P(X i = 1) = p i ∈ (0, 1), and denote x = E[S] = p 1 + . . . + p n . Consider a Poisson variable X ∼ Poisson(x) with the same expectation. The following result shows that S and X are close when the p i 's are small.
Theorem A.4. Let p = max{p 1 , . . . , p n }. Then (a) The following double inequality holds:
(A.9)
Proof. These properties follow from Barbour and Hall (1984 law of the random variable X MNE(Γ) set of mixed Nash equilibria of Γ N e i:e∈s i U i , i.e., random number of players who use resource e N t random number of players of type t in a Poisson game N (N t ) t ∈T N set of players Opt(Γ ∞ ) optimum social cost in Γ ∞ Opt(Γ) optimum expected social cost in Γ P σ probability measure induced by σ PNE(Γ) set of pure Nash equilibria of Γ PoA price of anarchy PoS price of stability r i probability of player i being active r n max i∈N n r n i , defined in Eq. (4.2b) S t set of strategies for type t s strategy profile s i strategy of player i S i random strategy of player i SC( , x) social cost of ( , 
